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Top Tens in 2010:

Patent, Trademark, Copyright and Trade Secret Cases

Stephen McJohn *
Draft 12.15.2010
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property (forthcoming January 2011)

The following are notable intellectual property decisions in 2010 in the United States.
Viewed across doctrinal lines, some interesting threads emerge.
The scope of protection was at issue in each area. Bilski marked a shift from using
technical tests for patent subject matter to relying on the basic exclusions against patents on laws
of nature, physical phenomena, or abstract ideas. Molecular Pathology called into question the
*

Professor of Law, Suffolk University School of Law. This listing and analysis are decidedly subjective, and
all the usual disclaimers apply. Comments welcome: smcjohn@suffolk.edu.
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many thousands of issued patents on human genes. In trademark, the issue of which uses may be
potentially infringing remains unsettled. Golan v. Holder addressed the constitutional limits on
the scope of copyright. Several copyright cases analyzed fair use, that elusive boundary around
copyright scope. Trade secret protection was held applicable to the concept for a product and to
high-frequency trading software.
The issue of secondary liability remains widely litigated, as rights holders seek both deep
pocket defendants and a means to cut off individual infringers. The courts applied slightly
different standards as to the state of mind required for secondary liability. YouTube was held not
liable for its users commonly uploading copyright-infringing videos, provided YouTube
responded to knowledge of specific infringements. 1 eBay was likewise not liable for sales of
counterfeit trademarked goods, unless it had knowledge of particular infringing listings. But in
patent (in a case involving importation of goods), deliberate indifference to the risk of patent
infringement was held sufficient by the Federal Circuit – a ruling that the Supreme Court has
taken on review.
Many of the cases involved disputes between hiring and hired parties, over the ownership
of intellectual property rights. The Supreme Court took a case on whether professors or
universities may assign rights to federally funded inventions. Büchel addressed whether an artist
may prevent a museum from showing an unfinished commissioned work. Gaylord addressed
whether a party that commissions a work, but does not obtain the copyright, may use fair use to
exploit derivative works. JustMed held that a start-up company may claim ownership over
employee’s creation under the work-made-for-hire doctrine, even where the start-up has failed to
observe the normal formalities of employee/employer relations. Most of the trade secret cases
1

MDY Industries v. Blizzard Entertainment held that there was no secondary liability for providing software
that enabled users to make use of video game software beyond their licensed use.
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involved employees. Bimbo Bakeries upheld an injunction against hiring a competitor’s
employee, where it was likely that the employee would use trade secrets in his new position. A
competitor may reverse engineer a competitor’s product. But Faiveley held that you cannot use
the competitor’s employees to do it. The parties often agree on who will own information
produced by the employee. The question in Mattel was whether an assignment of “inventions”
covered the idea for a product.
A number of cases concerned the relationship between intangible rights and physical
works. Solo Cup addressed the extent of liability for inaccurately marking a product as patented.
Ariad analyzed just how an applicant must show possession of an invention in order to entitled to
a patent. Intervet analyzed whether the scope of a biotech patent is limited to a sample that the
inventor submitted to show possession of the invention. AuTomotive decided whether the owner
of genuine Volkswagen badges could affix them to other cars sold. Jay Franco held that the
shape of a round beach towel could not be protected as a trademark. Vernor concerned whether
someone that bought restricted copies of software could sell them on eBay. 2

2

One issue not decided in 2010 was whether a copyright owner can control gray market goods – goods
made outside the United States with permission of the copyright owner, but imported without permission. The
Supreme Court took cert. in the case, but split 4-4 and so issued no decision. See Costco Wholesale Corp. v.
Omega, No. 08-1423 (December 13, 2010).
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Patent

1.

Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 177 L. Ed. 2d 792 (2010)

The Supreme Court, for the first time in decades, addressed the boundaries of patentable
subject matter. The specific question was whether a general process for using commodity
exchange transactions to hedge risks fell within patentable subject matter. The more general
question was, what standard governs the patentability of processes. Bilski rejected a rigid test
formulated by the Federal Circuit, under which a process was only patentable if it was tied to a
particular machine or transformed an article.3 That test, if narrowly applied, could have barred
many patents on business methods, software, and biotech processes (such as diagnostic
methods). Bilski rejected the machine-or-transformation test, along with earlier courts have
formulated, such as the State Street 4 useful-concrete-tangible test, the rule against patenting
“mental steps,” 5 or the applied-algorithm test. 6 Bilski did not, however, formulate a new test for
patentable subject matter, rather leaving standing only the long-standing rule that bars patents for
laws of laws of nature, physical phenomena, or abstract ideas.
Bilski also specifically declined to adopt a categorical exclusion for patents on business
methods. Had Bilski held that business methods were not patentable, that would have required

3

See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (1998).
5
In re Comiskey, 89 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir., Jan. 13, 2009)(pure mental process not patentable).
6
See In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (CCPA 1978)(formulating test known as the Freeman-Walter-Abele
test). For Professor Dratler’s thorough critique of the tests, see 1 JAY DRATLER, JR. AND STEPHEN M.
MCJOHN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COMMERCIAL CREATIVE AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY
§ 2.03 (2010).
4
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courts to define just what a “business method” is – something neither courts nor commentators
have achieved, despite much discussion of the whether business methods should be patentable. 7
After Bilski, patent law takes an approach similar to copyright law, with respect to subject
matter. Ideas are not copyrightable. That deceptively simple rule really states a broad policy,
which cases have applied differently in different areas, ranging from literature to computer
software. Copyright has managed to adapt to several generations of new technology by holding
that ideas are not copyrightable, but the expression of an idea is. Bilski indicates a similar
approach in patent law. Bilski would seem to move away from attempt to define patent subject
matter with various technical tests. Bilski instead leaves a broad rule against patents that claim
laws of nature, physical phenomena, or abstract ideas, but leaving open patent protection on
applications of laws of nature, physical phenomena, or abstract ideas.

2.

Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent and Trademark Office, 702

F.Supp.2d 181 (SDNY 2010):

Molecular Pathology reopens the question of the patentability of genes. As noted in
Bilski, courts have long denied patent protection for natural phenomena. That would seem to bar
patents on genes that exist in nature. But the Federal Circuit has repeatedly upheld the validity of
gene patents. 8 The USPTO has issued many thousands of patents on genes, on the theory that by
isolating the gene, the inventor has identified something that is different from the gene as it
exists in nature.
7

See, e.g., John R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility of Improving Patent Quality One
Technology at a Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729, 766–68 (2006).
8
See, e.g., In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Notably, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly upheld
gene patents in cases like Deuel, but without directly addressing the threshold issue of subject matter.
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Molecular Pathology, however, rejected this reasoning, holding that isolated DNA is not
“markedly different” from the gene, encoded in DNA as it appears in nature. The court
invalidated patents held by Myriad Genetics on two genes related to breast and ovarian cancer,
along with Myriad’s patents on methods to detect cancer by analyzing and comparing a person’s
DNA. Molecular Pathology presents a conflict between two deep policies: the policy of
providing an incentive for socially valuable innovations (such as discovering genes linked to
disease) and the policies of leaving nature phenomena open to scientific research and preventing
ownership of natural phenomena – especially acute where the ownership is of human genes. In
that vein, Molecular Pathology presents a difficult distinction between discovering natural
phenomena and inventions that apply that knowledge.
The appeal is pending before the Federal Circuit. The importance of the case may be
difficult to assess. Patents on single genes may be less important that had been believed only
years ago. Even though the human genome has been sequenced, few diseases or conditions have
been linked to single genes. Rather, many genes are usually involved, which may diminish the
importance of any single gene patent. 9

3.

Bid for Position LLC v. AOL LLC, 601 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir., 2010).

As Bilski shows, one hazard of patents (especially software and business method
patents), is that they may be too abstract, giving patents on idea as opposed to an application of
an idea. A similar problem is that even where an application is claimed, the abstract words to
claim processes may be hard to interpret, and could be read more broadly than the actual
9

See Personalized Medicine in the Genomic Era, Scientific American (June 24, 2010).
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invention. 10 Bid for Position illustrates that much may turn on interpretation of particular patent
claims. The court held that Google's AdWords system did not infringe patent claims on a method
for continuous online auctioning of “priority position” for advertisers. Read broadly, the claim
could have given patent protection over online auctions of advertising. The court construed it to
apply only to auctions similar to those described in the written description portion of the patent
application. Bilski addressed a momentous question – what is the extent of patentable subject
matter. But in practical terms, cases like Bid for Position may play a more important role. Few
patents fall at the borders of patentable subject matter – but because every patent claim is unique,
interpretation of claims plays the workhorse role in determining what is actually patented. 11

4.

Janssen Pharmaceutica v. Teva, 583 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2009)

The utility requirement is another front on the battle against patenting ideas. Bilski dealt
with the issue of a broad patent claim on an abstract idea. The utility requirement – the
requirement that the applicant show the invention has a specific, existing usefulness – prevents
ideas from being patented before application to an invention. Janssen Pharmaceutica shows that
the utility requirement still has bite, especially in the area of pharmaceuticals. The court held
invalid a patent on a method of treatment (by administering a drug) for Alzheimer’s disease. The
patent failed to meet the utility requirement because, at the time of filing the patent application,

10

See generally, James Bessen & Michael Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers
Put Innovators At Risk 199, 256 (Princeton U. Press. 2008)(discussing hazards of “abstract patent claims” in
software and business method patents, which may “cover unknown territory, claiming technologies that are
unknown at the time the patent is filed and that might change over time, especially in the fast-moving fields of
technology”).
11
Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd., 617 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2010) , addressed the relationship between disclosure
of the invention and the interpretation of biotech claims. The court held that the claims to a porcine circovirus
should not be limited to the specific type of virus deposited as a sample.
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the applicant did not show efficacy of the drug, through either neither in vitro test results nor
animal test results. The court also rejected the argument that utility could be shown by “analytic
reasoning.”
Janssen could be coupled with ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals LLC. 12 The court
invalidated a broad patent claim on a method for using a drug to treat attention deficit and
hyperactivity disorder. The patent application did not meet the enablement requirement, which
requires the applicant to disclose how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention.
The application did not properly disclose the method of ascertaining dosage in the manner
necessary to support the broadly method. In short, the enablement requirement guards against
parties claiming more broadly than the invention they have disclosed. It likewise guards against
patenting ideas, because it requires a broad claim to be supported by description of how to fully
make and use the invention.
Janssen and ALZA, taken together, show what may really be at stake in cases like Bilski
and Molecular Pathology. If genes are patentable, such patents must still meet the utility and
enablement requirements. Thousands of patents on isolated genes exist, but some applicants may
not have shown a specific practical utility at the time of the application. If they did, the claims
would still be limited to the scope of the useful invention disclosed. Contrariwise, if patent
claims on isolated genes are held invalid, the patentees in many cases will have other claims to
fall back on. Useful inventions based on those genes would still be patentable. So, in many cases,
the controversies about the scope of patent subject matter do not determine the scope of what
specific inventions may be patented.

12

603 F.3d 935 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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5.

Princo Corp. v. International Trade Com'n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010)(en banc)

Princo is an important case with respect to the ability a patent holder has to impose
restrictions on its licensing practices that may impact competition. Anti-trust law provides
remedies where a patent holder misuses market power or attempts to monopolize a market in
prohibited ways. But most patents do not provide monopoly power, rather at best give exclusive
rights to one product or service that competes against others. A long-standing issue has been,
when does anti-competitive behavior become patent misuse? In Princo, the en banc Federal
Circuit made it difficult to show patent misuse. The court held misuse inapplicable to a patent
pool license program for an industry standard for compact disk technology. In general terms, the
court held that when a patentee offers to license a patent, the patentee does not misuse that
patent by inducing a third party not to license its separate, competitive technology. Princo gives
latitude to patent holders to leverage their exclusive rights into other markets – somewhat in
tension with the first sale cases discussed below.

6.

Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010)

Solo Cup greatly reduced the potential liability for false patent marking. Sellers like to
include patent numbers on products and packaging. “U.S. Patent Number 4,404,078” on the
package of, say, a shoe horn, may suggest to potential buyers that it is a true invention. An
inventor is entitled to patent any new and nonobvious invention. It need not be superior to
existing products, particularly effective, or even safe. But the patent marking on a package
nevertheless may suggest to consumer that the item is better than competing products and
9
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somehow sanctioned by the U.S. government. It also discourages competitors from copying the
product. Manufacturers, however, sometimes include inaccurate patent marking. The patent may
have expired (often, no one has the job of reviewing old packaging for whether the patents are
still in effect), the seven-digit number may be wrong, or the patent may not actually apply to the
product, perhaps because of miscommunication between the seller’s legal and marketing people.
The Federal Circuit had scared sellers in 2009 by interpreting the false marking provision
in the patent statute to reckon statutory damages per item sold, as opposed to per violation.13
Like the report of a gold strike, the case sparked a cottage industry of false marking suits. A juicy
target was the Solo Plastic Cup company. Solo makes and sells billions of plastic cups. In that
low margin business, Solo decided not to spend the money to change its manufacturing molds
when its patents expired. As it knowingly sold falsely marked cups, it risked a gigantic award. A
few cents per cup adds up, if multiplied by millions. The Federal Circuit, however, held that the
false marking statute applies liability only when the defendant acts with intent to deceive the
public. Solo acted to save manufacturing costs, not to deceive the public, and so escaped
liability. Manufacturers breathed a sigh of relief.

7.

SEB (T-Fal) v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted,

178 L. Ed. 2d 286 (2010)

SEB addressed a question of, what state of mind is necessary for secondary liability,
which the Supreme Court will review next year. Specifically, when may a party be liable for the
infringement of others? Federal Circuit case law had suggested that a party could be liable for
13

See In Forest Group Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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inducing infringement only where “he or she knew of the patent." 14 In SEB, the defendant did
not specifically know of the patent in question. Rather, it copied the features of a deep fryer.
Knowing that there were numerous patents on products in that market, the defendant deliberately
avoided analyzing whether that particular product was patented. The Federal Circuit held that
such “deliberate indifference of a known risk” was sufficient. The SEB case will provide the
Supreme Court an opportunity to expand on the standards for secondary infringement that it
explored in copyright, in Grokster. 15
SEB also addressed a key issue on the intersection between commercial law and patent
law. Patent law is territorial. If a product is patented in the US, its sale abroad does not infringe
the US patent. If a seller ships goods from China, does that infringe? The seller in SEB argued
that there was no infringement by shipping goods from China, because the goods were shipped
“FOB China” – meaning that the seller’s obligations under the sales law were fulfilled once the
goods were shipped. But the court looked past the formalities of the Uniform Commercial Code
to the practical reality, which was that the seller had shipped goods to a buyer in the US.

8.

Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010)(en banc)

Ariad addressed the question, how does an inventor show that she has sufficient
possession of the invention to be entitled to a patent? The concept of possession lies deep in
property law. Possession governed claims of ownership of a wild fox in Pierson v. Post the first
case in many property courses. To get a patent, an inventor must submit an application

14

DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc).
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 935, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 162 L. Ed.
2d 781 (2005).

15
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describing the invention and enabling others to use it. The Federal Circuit has held this to be two
requirements: enablement, which requires the inventor to disclose to others how to make and use
the invention, and written description, which requires the inventor to show that she had
“possession” of the invention when she filed her application. Some have argued that this reads
two requirements where the statute has one, and smuggles in a property law concept that the
statute does not require. The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc in Ariad, affirmed that the written
description requirement is separate from the enablement requirement. This has considerable
practical impact in areas like biotech and chemistry, where an inventor may be able to make a
useful invention before she has determined just how to describe what it is. Under Ariad, she must
wait to file until she can provide conceptual proof of “possession.” Delay can cost money, and
even cost patent rights, such as if publications or other products in the area make the invention
nonpatentable.

9.

Sky Technologies v. SAP, 576 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2010)

Patent law is federal law. Commercial law is generally state law, governed by various
state’s adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code. Where the two bodies of law overlap, there
can be uncertainty as to which governs. Sky Technologies addressed a key issue in the
intersection between intellectual property and commercial law. Possession had played a comical
role in In re Coldwave Systems. 16 A lender had not filed to perfect its security interest in a patent
given as collateral for a loan. The creditor creatively, if vainly, argued that it need not file,
because it had possession of the patent certificate, just as a pawnshop perfects by possession of
16

In re Coldwave, LLC, 368 B.R. 91, 98 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007).
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the jewelry in its safe. Coldwave reflects a great uncertainty in the intersection between
commercial law and intellectual property. Courts have struggled to rule whether a creditor should
file in the federal office (the USPTO or the Copyright Office) or in the relevant state Uniform
Commercial Code filing system. 17
Sky Technologies addressed a related uncertainty: whether federal law or state law
governs the procedure for sale of the collateral, if the lender forecloses and sells the patent. The
Federal Circuit held that state law governs. That meant that state foreclosure law could apply,
and the patent sold subject to the same procedures and protections that govern other types of
collateral. Intellectual property is the subject of many finance transactions, from loans to joint
ventures to securitization and beyond. The simple and clear approach taken by Sky Technologies
(treating intellectual property like any collateral) will facilitate those transactions.

10.

Crocs, Inc. v. U.S.International Trade Commission, 598 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

Crocs provides considerable guidance on the question, how much inventive spark is
required to get a patent in this high-tech age. Nonobviousness is the central requirement for
patent protection. An applicant is not entitled to a patent if the claimed invention would have
been obvious to one working in the relevant field, in light of all work in the field. In KSR, 18 the
Supreme Court set a new, more flexible standard. Previously, courts had held that an invention
would be nonobvious unless there was a specific item with “teaching, suggestion or motivation”
for making the invention. KSR rejected that rigid test, giving the USPTO and courts more
17

See In re Cybernetic Services. Inc., 252 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2001)(holding security interest in patents
perfected by state law filing); In re Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd., 116 B.R. 194, 199-200 (C.D. Cal., 1990)(holding
federal filing required for copyrights).
18
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417, 127 S. Ct. 1727, 167 L. Ed. 2d 705 (2007).
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latitude in deciding if an invention was obvious. KSR allowed courts to look not just to specific
work in the field, but also to market conditions, the path of technological development, and even
common sense, in assessing if an innovation was predictable.
There were a good number of obviousness cases in 2010, as courts adjust to the change in
approach. Crocs is included simply as an example of the practical approach courts are taking.
Even a very low-tech invention may still be held nonobvious, and so patentable. The use of foam
straps was held to be a patentable invention, largely because previous work in the field “taught
away” from foam straps. Straps had been used on shoes, and foam had been used in shoes, but
the inelastic nature of foam made it seem unsuitable as a strap material. So although KSR has
given courts and the USPTO more flexibility to deny patents, simple but genuine innovations
may still qualify for protection.

Patent Pending

Three patent cases are pending before the Supreme Court:

Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche Molecular Systems Inc.,
583 F.3d 832 (Fed. Cir., 2009), cert. granted, 178 L. Ed. 2d 368 (2010)(whether university
inventors may assign rights to federally funded inventions)

14
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SEB (T-Fal) v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 178 L.
Ed. 2d 286 (2010)(whether “deliberate indifference” to existence of patent sufficient for
secondary liability)

i4i LP v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831 ( Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted., no. 10-290
(2010)(whether presumption of patent validity applies, where patent office did not consider the
relevant prior art)

The Federal Circuit has en banc decisions pending in two cases with broad applicability:

Therasense, Inc. et al. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. et al., 374 Fed. Appx. 35 (Fed. Cir. 2010)(on
when inequitable conduct in obtaining a patent may make the patent unenforceable)

TiVo v. EchoStar, 376 Fed. Appx. 21 (Fed. Cir. 2010)(on when civil contempt proceedings or
infringement proceedings should apply, where a modified product is used after an injunction
against infringement)

15
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Trademark

1.

American Needle v. National Football League, _ U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 2201, 2212, _ L.Ed. _

(2010).

American Needle addressed the issue, to what extent competitors may band together in
using trademarks to exclude other potential competitors. As Princo shows in the patent context,
intellectual property policy often requires weighing exclusive rights against market forces.
Princo involved the limits on agreements a patent holder could make with others that might
restrict competition. American Needle analyzed the question of when a rights holder is, for antitrust purposes, negotiating with others or with itself. The question was whether the teams of the
National Football League were single entity, or competitors, potentially liable under anti-trust
laws for concerted action in trademark licensing. The Court held that even if the teams have to
cooperate to produce football games, “the teams compete with one another, not only on the
playing field, but to attract fans, for gate receipts and for contracts with managerial and playing
personnel.” 19 For competitors to band together the control the market for licensing their
trademarks therefore was a potential anti-trust violation. The ruling has considerable impact
beyond sports licensing. In many industries, competitors have to cooperate, such as forming
committees to set industry technology standards. American Needle may play a role in separating
permissible cooperation from exclusionary practices.

19

American Needle, 130 S.Ct. at 2212
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2.

Sensient Technologies Corp. v. SensoryEffects Flavor Co., 613 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2010)

Sensient continues the efforts of courts to define which categories of uses of a trademark
may potentially infringe. Trademarks are part of the basic vocabulary of a commercial society.
There is no trademark infringement without use, in commerce, of the mark or a similar symbol.
But courts have differed on what constitutes “use” of a mark. Use of the mark only infringes if
there is a likelihood of confusion. But the likelihood of confusion is a multi-factor determination,
which makes it hard to predict whether particular uses infringe. So the initial question may be,
what constitutes a use of the mark, for the purposes of trademark law. Is a mark “used” every
time it is mentioned, quoted, referred to, listed, or otherwise employed? Or does “use” have a
narrower meaning in trademark law, referring to only use of the mark as a trademark?
Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 20 had held that sale of trademarks in keyword
advertising was use of the mark, for the purposes of trademark law. The appellate court
remanded the case, for determination of whether the use was likely to cause confusion, and
therefore infringed. By contrast, Sensient Technologies held that use of a competitor’s mark in
news releases and (non-sales) presentations was not a use in commerce. So the question of
whether there was likelihood of confusion was not reached. The boundaries of trademark
protection remain unsettled. The question remains, how courts will draw the boundaries: by
defining categories that fall inside or outside “use” of the mark, or by relying on the old standby,
whether there is a likelihood of confusion.

3.

Tiffany v. eBay, 600 F.3d 93 (2nd Cir. 2010)

20

562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir.2009).
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Secondary liability is of primary importance in applying intellectual property to internet
issues. Infringers may be numerous and hard to track down. But thousands of infringers may use
a single online service provider, such as YouTube or eBay. So online service providers make a
juicy target for rights holders. The Second Circuit, however, held that eBay was not liable for
users' sales of knockoff Tiffany products. It held that for “contributory trademark infringement
liability to lie, a service provider must have more than a general knowledge or reason to know
that its service is being used to sell counterfeit goods. Some contemporary knowledge of which
particular listings are infringing or will infringe in the future is necessary.” 21 This echoes the
approach taken in copyright, in the Viacom case discussed below. Tiffany marks a convergence
in the standards governing internet service providers, whether their customers upload videos or
auction knock-offs.

4.

Gucci America, Inc. v. Frontline Processing Corp.,--- F.Supp.2d ----, 2010 WL 2541367,

(S.D.N.Y., 2010)

Gucci provides a nice contrast to Tiffany. Credit card processors, as financial institutions,
are also attractive defendants. To get paid, infringers need to use a payment system. The issue
was of liability for processing credit card transactions for online merchants that sold knockoffs
of Gucci products. Simply processing credit card transactions would not give rise to liability. But
a credit card processor would be liable if it knowingly served high risk clients and helped them

21

Tiffany v. eBay, 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2nd Cir. 2010).
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to infringe, such as by suggesting that purchasers must check a box recognizing that they were
buying replicas, in order to reduce the number of returns.

5.

Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A. Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010) and DSPT

International Inc. v. Nahum, No. 08-55062 (9th Cir. 2010).

Toyota Motor Sales and DSPT International provide guidance on the issue, when use of a
domain name is in bad faith. The Internet has opened up many vistas for uses of trademarks,
whether by mark owners to market their wares, or for others to communicate (in ways good and
bad) with others interested in the relevant product or services. The Anti-Cybersquatting Act
specifically regulates one category of use, by prohibiting bad faith use of another’s mark in a
domain name. The statute takes its name from an early practice of simply registering a mark as a
domain name (say, Microsoft.com) before the mark owner became web savvy enough to register
the domain name, then “squatting” on the domain until the mark owner ransomed it. Practices
have become more complex, requiring courts to sift out bad faith from bona fide uses. Toyota
Motor Sales held that an automobile broker’s use of “Lexus” in its domain name was not bad
faith. The relevant domains were buy-a-lexus.com and buyorleaselexus.com. The broker was not
a Toyota dealer, but dealt in Toyotas along with other automobiles. Although the broker used
Toyota’s mark, it used it in a legitimate manner to describe its goods.
Good faith use of a domain name can become bad faith. In DSPT, an employee of a
clothing merchant registered a domain name, www.eq-Italy.com, for the company. The
company used the site with increasing success over the years. The employee and the company
then parted ways. Not long after, any visitor to www.eq-Italy.com saw only a notice referring
19
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“all fashion related questions” to the employee’s email address. The employee demanded a
considerable sum to hand over the domain. The Ninth Circuit held that the employee used the
domain in bad faith. He had registered it in good faith, and had never used it to deceive potential
customers. But bad faith goes beyond such classic cybersquatting, to encompass other abusive
practices. Toyota and DSPT together provide considerable guidance on how courts will unpack
the broad standard of “bad faith.”

6.

Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am. , 603 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2010)

Under first sale (also known as exhaustion), the buyer of an authorized product may use
it. But first sale has definite limits. In Au-Tomotive Gold, defendants bought genuine
Volkswagen badges, and put them on cars not produced by Volkswagen. First sale does not
authorize such a use, and there was the requisite likelihood of confusion for infringement.
Consumers could be confused, thinking that the cars were produced by or endorsed by
Volkswagen. Au-Tomotive Gold shows that ownership of an object does not mean that the object
is free of the ownership of others.

7.

Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products LP v. Myers Supply Inc., 621 F.3d 771 (8th Cir.

2010)

Georgia-Pacific provided another angle on whether trademarked products may be mixed with
other goods. Georgia Pacific sold a touch-less paper-towel dispenser, trademarked “enMotion.”
Georgia Pacific also sold paper towels to fit the dispenser. The defendant sold replacement
20
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paper towels that fit the dispenser. Unlike Au-Tomotive Gold, there was no showing of
likelihood of confusion. Evidence of industry practices showed that it was common practice to
use substitute paper towels. There was no showing that bathroom consumers were likely to be
confused about the source of the towels.
Georgia-Pacific is different from Au-Tomotive Gold in a more fundamental way. Finding
infringement in Au-Tomotive Gold prevented the use of a mark on goods from a different source.
Volkswagen’s mark could not be used on other cars. But finding infringement in Georgia-Pacific
would have prevented the use of a mark on a separate market for goods. By selling paper towel
dispensers, Georgia Pacific would have the exclusive market for towels for the dispenser.
Georgia-Pacific shows that the trademark owner has limited control over authorized products
that have left her hands. As long as they are not used in a manner that is likely to confuse the
relevant consumer, the trademark owner does not have the right to prevent uses that may hurt in
the marketplace.

8.

VISA International Service Ass'n v. JSL Corp., 610 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2010)

The use of the mark eVisa for an English language tutoring service would not infringe the
famous mark Visa for credit card services. The marks are pretty similar, but the services are so
different that there would not be the requisite likelihood of confusion. But famous marks have
protection against not just infringement, but dilution. Dilution became almost impossible to show
(in a case where there was not infringement as well), under the Supreme Court’s 2004 Moseley
decision, which interpreted the statute to require a showing that the defendant’s use actually
decreased the distinctive power of the famous mark. Congress subsequently amended the statute
21
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to require only a likelihood of dilution, and dilution has become resurgent. Charbucks diluted
Starbucks (despite far different graphics); 22 the The Other Red Meat, for salmon, diluted The
Other White Meat, used by the Pork Board; 23 and SEE IT SAY IT used by a mom and pop
therapeutic products company diluted Mattel’s popular SEE’N’SAY game. 24 Commentators
have questioned the broadening of dilution. Marks like Charbucks and The Other Red Meat
might actually reinforce the distinctiveness of their famous targets, by reinforcing the mark. But
courts have interpreted dilution broadly. Given that the typical dilution defendant is generally a
small business facing up to a famous adversary (by the definition of the cause of action), this
trend of cases may cause considerable caution in treading anywhere near the commercial
footprints of giants.

9.

Jay Franco & Sons Inc. v. Franek, 615 F.3d 855 (7th Cir. 2010)

Jay Franco emphasizes the boundaries between trademark and copyright. The round
design of a beach towel cannot be trademarked. The circular shape is functional, because a round
towel will work differently than a towel of a different shape. A seller that wishes to have
exclusive rights in functional elements must invent and patent them – and the round beach towel
would hardly be a novel invention. Trademark cannot be used to get such quasi-patent
protection. As the court put it, one cannot get “a trademark on the circle.” 25
22

Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2009).
National Pork Board and National Pork Producers Council v. Supreme Lobster and Seafood Company,
Opposition No. 91166701 (TTAB 2010).
24
Super Duper, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 382 Fed. Appx. 308 (4th Cir. 2010).
25
See also Specialized Seating, Inc. v. Greenwich Indus., L.P., 616 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2010)(decided the
same day, holding that the design for an x-frame folding chair is functional, and so not protectable as a mark). See
also Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., No. 1:09cv736 (GBL/TCB) ( E.D. Va. 2010)(holding that Google was not
liable for using trademarks in key word advertising, because the marks serve “an essential indexing function”).
23
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10.

FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, No. 08-16382 (9th Cir. 2010)

FreecycleSunnyvale is a rare case holding that a mark holder failed to sufficiently control
use of the mark, and therefore lost trademark protection. Trademark protection, unlike copyright
and patent, requires the holder to control the use of the mark. A trademark serves to distinguish
one source of goods or services from other sources. If the mark holder allows others freely to use
the mark, then the mark does not serve to identify a source, and so is not a valid mark. Courts,
however, generally apply a relatively lax standard. As long as a mark holder retains some ability
to control use of the mark, the mark remains valid, even if license widely to others.
In FreecycleSunnyvale, the mark holder did not even exercise that level of control. The
court held that the licensor engaged in “naked licensing,” thereby abandoning the mark. The
court held that the licensor did not retain express contractual control or actual control over its
licensees’ quality control measures, and was unreasonable in relying on the licensee's quality
control measures. By licensing the mark without retaining control over its use, the mark owner
surrendered its right to exclude others from using the mark. FreecycleSunnyvale reminds mark
owners not to take on the benefits of licensing the mark without retaining some control over their
licensee’s use of the mark.
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Copyright

1.

Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. ___, ___ , 130 S. Ct. 1237, 176 L. Ed. 2d 18,

26-28 (2010)

Reed Elsevier addressed a long-standing issue: whether registration of a copyright is a
jurisdictional requirement to bring an infringement action – or just a requirement. The distinction
has great weight. If a requirement is jurisdictional, then failure to meet the requirement emans
that the action must be dismissed – even if the case is on appeal when the issue is first raised. It
also means that parties (as in Reed Elsevier) who have not registered their works may not be
parties to a lawsuit. That could considerably complicate resolution of issues that involve large
number of copyrights, where some are registered and others are not.
The copyright statute provides that a copyright owner must register the copyright before
bringing an action for infringement. The statute is not clear on whether that requirement is
jurisdictional (meaning no infringement action may be brought without registration) or could be
excused in some cases. In Reed Elsevier, the Supreme Court held that the provision was not
jurisdictional. Therefore, a federal district court had jurisdiction over class action brought by
freelance authors claiming infringement by the Google Book Project, even though not all the
allegedly infringed works were registered. The Court, however, acknowledged that the statute
generally requires registration before litigation, suggesting that the requirement will be relaxed
only in unusual cases. Reed Elsevier, then, continues the general rule requiring litigation, but will

24

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1731887

allow exceptions where other policies are at work. This will enable courts to resolve otherwise
nonjudiciable complex copyright issues.

2.

Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010)

Golan addressed the possible limits of copyright law. In 1998, Congress added 20 years
to the term of existing copyrights. The Supreme Court rejected two constitutional challenges to
the statute. The Court held that Congress had not exceeded its power to grant copyrights for
“limited Times” in order to “promote the Progress of Science.” Nor had Congress violated the
First Amendment. Rather, First Amendment scrutiny would not apply where Congress had not
“altered the traditional contours of copyright.” Simply extending the term of copyright, in this
view, fit within the traditional copyright scheme.
In Golan, a non-traditional expansion of copyright did arise. Golan addressed the
constitutionality of the restoration provisions, which were enacted when the United States finally
joined Berne Convention. Unlike extending the term of existing copyrights, the restoration
provisions actually grant copyright to works that had been in the public domain. The restoration
provisions restore copyright protection to foreign works that fell into public domain in the U.S.
for failure to meet formality requirements, such as the requirement of a copyright notice.
Because that takes works out of the public domain, the question arose whether it violated the
First Amendment. Golan held the statute passed First Amendment muster, because it was
narrowly tailored to serve substantial governmental interests. After Golan, Congress retains very
broad power to legislate with respect to copyright – even where the legislation is quite different
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from what copyright law has done in the past, and where it creates conflict with expressive
interests.

3.

Viacom Int'l v. YouTube, 95 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1766 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)

Viacom is a key case on whether internet service providers must monitor their customers
for copyright infringement. Internet service providers are not liable for infringement by their
customers, provided they have a program to attend to alleged infringement. 26 The standards
required of such programs have been disputed. Viacom argued that YouTube should not have
immunity, where YouTube failed to take down infringing videos, despite its knowledge of
widespread infringement on the site. The court, however, read the provision more narrowly,
holding it sufficient that a service provider responds to “knowledge of specific and identifiable
infringements of particular individual items,” not just general knowledge of infringement.
Because of the widespread allegations of internet copyright infringement, Viacom has
considerable impact, because it does not require internet service providers to actively seek out
and take down infringing material, rather requires them to respond when they gain knowledge.

4.

Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010)

Vernor bought copies of AutoCAD, sophisticated computer-aided design software, and
sold them on eBay. Autodesk object, on the grounds that such sales infringed its exclusive right
to distribute copies of the software to the public. After the copyright owner distributes copies for
26

17 U.S.C. § 512.
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a price, how much control can it retain over the copies? First sale27 balances the new owner’s
rights in the object against the copyright owner’s interests. If I buy a book, first sale allows me to
sell it or display it, the copyright owner’s exclusive rights to distribute or display the work
notwithstanding. Software companies typically attempt to avoid first sale, by characterizing the
transaction simply as a license to use the software, as opposed to a sale of the software. Vernor
upheld this argument, holding that there was no sale of the software. The court looked the three
factors in deciding whether a “software user is a licensee, rather than an owner of a copy. First,
we consider whether the copyright owner specifies that a user is granted a license. Second, we
consider whether the copyright owner significantly restricts the user's ability to transfer the
software. Finally, we consider whether the copyright owner imposes notable use restrictions.” 28
All three factors, in the court’s view, indicated a license rather than a sale. Autodesk’s license
stated that the transaction was a license, not a sale of the software and that Autodesk retained
title to the software. There were transfer restrictions: the license was nontransferable without
Autodesk's written consent, and could not be transferred outside the Western Hemisphere. There
were use restrictions: it prohibited use outside the Western Hemisphere; prohibited modifying,
translating, or reverse-engineering the software, prohibited removing trademarks or copy
protection devices. In short, Vernor appears to hold that a software transaction characterized as
a license will be treated only as a license, if the seller so chooses and provides significant
restrictive clauses.
That analysis is notably different from sales law. Where a party delivers goods for a price
and the other party is entitled to keep them as long as the price is paid – that is a sale, regardless
of what the parties call it. Vernor takes the opposite approach with software, essentially making
27
28

17 U.S.C. § 109.
Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010).
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first sale an optional doctrine. But doing so avoids some complicated, yet necessary preemption
issues: to what extent the parties can use state law contracts to contract around federal copyright
law rules, such as first sale and fair use. In other words, even if the transaction was held to be a
sale, there would remain the question of whether those clauses were effective against a
transferee of the software. In any event, first sale is less relevant to many software transactions
now, where licensees often no longer receive a copy of the software, rather use it use online.

5.

Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, No. 07cv11446-NG (D. Mass. 2010); and

Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (D. Minn. 2010)

As Viacom shows, one way to address widespread infringement is to seek liability from
the internet service providers used by the actual infringers. Another tactic is to seek big
judgments against the actual infringers, in order to discourage others. Two district courts
overturned big jury verdicts against music downloaders. Actual damages for downloading thirty
songs might be thirty dollars. But the Copyright Act authorizes statutory damages in the range of
$750 to $200,000 per work infringed Capitol Records used slightly different approach. The court
remitted an award of $1.92 million down to $54,000. With remitter, the defendant can accept
the revised award or go to trial again. On retrial, the next jury awarded $1.5 million. Sony used a
different basis, holding that $675,000 in statutory damages for downloading 30 songs was
unconstitutional, as contrary to due process. The court reduced the award to $67,500, following
the $2,250 per song benchmark of Capitol Records. Whether these decisions are upheld on
appeal will have considerable meaning for future actions against downloaders.
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6.

Maverick Recording Co. v. Harper, 598 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 2010)(cert. pending)

Maverick Recording addresses another state of mind issue: under what circumstances a
defendant’s lack of knowledge of copyright can reduce the damages awarded. In Maverick
Recording, plaintiffs sought just the $750 minimum statutory damages per song downloaded.
The defendant argued that her lack of knowledge of copyright law triggered the lower level of
$200 applicable to an “innocent infringer,” one who “was not aware and had no reason to believe
that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright.” The innocent infringer defense is
not available where a copyright notice appeared “on the published phonorecord or phonorecords
to which a defendant in a copyright infringement suit had access.” Because copyright notices
appeared on the CD’s the music companies sold to the public, the court reasoned, defendant had
access to phonorecords with notice, and so could not claim the innocent infringer defense. The
case presents a nice issue: whether the innocent infringer defense does not apply where the
copyright owner puts copyright notices on distributed copies, or whether an innocent infringer
may be one who had actual access to copies from another source.

7.

Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art Foundation Inc. v. Büchel, 593 F.3d 38 (1st

Cir. 2010)

Büchel provides guidance on the scope of protection under copyright law for an artist’s
right to protect the integrity of her work. Copyright law in the United States, unlike many
jurisdictions, provides little protection for “moral rights,” such as rights of attribution, and rights
of integrity. But the Copyright Act does provide rights of integrity and attribution to works of
29
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visual art. Büchel addressed how widely to define the protected class of works. An artist had
worked on an installation in the Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art Foundation. In
“Training Ground for Democracy,” visitors would play such roles as immigrants, activists,
looters and judges, working their way through installations ranging from a movie theater to an
aircraft fuselage. The artist and museum did not manage to finish the project together. When the
museum proposed showing the unfinished work, the artist sued. The court held that moral rights
do apply to unfinished works, and so the artist had the right to protect his rights of integrity and
attribution. As art changes, Büchel may have considerable impact. Artists increasingly create
works in collaboration with museums and other parties, and those collaborations do not always
work out. Under Büchel, unfinished works will be provided protection. Büchel also represents a
court willing to read the moral rights protections broadly, where courts in the United States have
often been reluctant to import those policies.

8.

Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010)

Büchel illustrates that copyright law in the United States explicitly provides moral rights
only for works of visual arts. But the general exclusive rights of copyright do provide an author
some protection for the integrity of the work. The exclusive right to prepare derivative works, for
example, gives the author control over the forms into which her work will be adapted. Fair use
may protect some adaptations, such as parodies that comment on the original work. But generally
the author gets to decide the artistic fate of her work. Salinger, for example, held that it was not
fair use, for an author to write a sequel to Catcher in the Rye. Fair use defies categorical rules.
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But it permit generalizations, such as one inferred from Salinger: parodies are likely to be fair
use; sequels are not.
Salinger’s fair use analysis fit comfortably within the existing case law. Salinger,
however, departed from the beaten pth on the issue of the proper remedy for copyright
infringement. In intellectual property cases, courts once readily granted injunctions when
infringement was shown. The Supreme Court, in eBay v. MercExchange, 29 however, held in a
patent case that the usual equitable standards should apply. The Court held that “a plaintiff
seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such
relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a
remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a
permanent injunction.” 30 Under eBay, if an alternative remedy such as damages is sufficient,
then the infringer may continue infringing, but pay damages.
Salinger followed that reasoning in the copyright context. Under Salinger, an infringer
may be permitted to continue its course of action, provided it can pay whatever damages will
make the copyright holder whole. Copyright, however, can involve a different category of
damages that patent and other cases. If copyright does protect the equivalent of moral rights for
artists, then injunctions may be necessary in cases where the monetary damages are small, but
injunctive relief is necessary to protect the author’s control over the integrity of the work. In turn,
courts may also consider the expressive interest of the infringer in presenting another version of

29
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eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 164 L. Ed. 2d 641 (2006) .
eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1838, 164 L. Ed. 2d 641, 645-46

(2006)
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the work. Salinger opens up a means for infringers to avoid injunctions, but leaves many
questions to be addressed on how to adapt the test to the specific context of copyright.

9.

Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010)

Fair use is key to copyright, because it provides a safety valve that prevents
overformalistic application of the exclusive rights of a copyright holder, and also provides room
for expressive use of works, that makes copyright compatible with the First Amendment. 31 But
fair use remains a difficulty rule to apply to any new set of facts, because of its multi-factor,
case-specific analysis.
The United States commissioned a sculpture for the Korean War Veterans Memorial. The
sculptor adamantly retained the copyright. The U.S. subsequently put a picture of the sculpture
on a postage stamp, and sold millions of copies. The image was used under a license agreement
granting permission only from the photographer. The sculptor was not consulted. The Federal
Circuit held that fair use did not authorize the U.S to use the image on the stamp without
permission from the sculptor. Transformative works may receive special leeway under fair use,
but the U.S. did little to transform the underlying work. The photographer simply made a very
fine photograph of the sculpture in the snow. More important, the U.S. itself made no
transformative use, simply choosing a work made by another. Nor did U.S. serve any other use
favored by fair use, such as criticism or commentary. The purpose of the stamp, like the
sculpture itself, was to commemorate the Korean War.

31

See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222, 123 S. Ct. 769, 154 L. Ed. 2d 683 (2003).

32

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1731887

The case is unusual among fair use cases, which usually involve someone using the work
of a stranger. Here, the U.S. sought to use fair use to make a use that it could have bargained for
in the original commission agreement. Fair use will rarely serve to allow one party to change the
terms of a negotiated agreement. Gaylord may have broad applicability, because so many
copyright cases involve disputes between parties to a cooperative relationship gone litigious.

10.

Righthaven v. Realty One Group Inc., No. 10-cv-1036-LRH-PAL, (D. Nev 2010)

One reason that fair use remains an unsettle doctrine is that is must constantly adapt to
new types of infringement cases. Righthaven has a Tolkienesque name, but is a business built on
the convergence between copyright and the internet, that world-wide machine for making and
distributing copies. Righthaven identifies web sites that have posted material copied from other
sites. It purchases the rights to the copied material, and sues for infringement. The question
raised is one endemic on the web: what is the scope of fair use? Righthaven v. Realty One Group
held that it was fair use, where a real estate company copied some eight sentences from a
newspaper article. The court gave great weight to the factual nature of the text. Factual works
have much thinner protection that creative works, because facts themselves are not copyrighted.
Another strong factor was that the copying was not a market substitute for the originals. In fact,
the copier linked to the original story, so may have actually increased its readership.
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11. 32

Statement of the Librarian of Congress Relating to Section 1201 Rulemaking (July 23,

2010), and MDY Industries v. Blizzard Entertainment, No. 09-15932, No. 09-16044 (9th Cir.,
December 14, 2010)

These two matters concern the interpretation of the anti-circumvention provisions, which
give legal protection to anti-copying and anti-access technology on copyrighted works. 33 The
first matter could be styled as Apple v. Jailbreakers. The Librarian of Congress authorized
“jailbreaking” of smartphones, bypassing access measures on the phone to allow them to run
applications (“apps,” in common parlance) that have not been authorized by the phone’s maker.
So, for example, iPhone users may now enable their phones to use applications not authorized by
Apple. The Librarian reasoned: “The fact that the person engaging in jailbreaking is doing so in
order to use Apple’s firmware on the device that it was designed to operate, which the
jailbreaking user owns, and to use it for precisely the purpose for which it was designed (but for
the fact that it has been modified to run applications not approved by Apple) favors a finding
that the purpose and character of the use is innocuous at worst and beneficial at best.” 34 The
reasoning was also supported by the statutory exemption for reverse engineering, as well as the
general copyright policy in favor of reverse engineering and against allowing copyright to limit
functional features of works. 35
The exemption, by itself, helps only the rather technologically sophisticated phone
owner. The exemption, by itself, authorizes the phone’s owner to open it to other applications,
32

Cf. This Is Spinal Tap (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1984)(“Nigel Tufnel: The numbers all go to eleven. Look,
right across the board, eleven, eleven, eleven and... Marty DiBergi: Oh, I see. And most amps go up to ten?”).
33
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201.
34
Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control
Technologies, 75 Fed. Reg. 43825, 43829 (July 27, 2010).
35
Id.
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but does not authorize anyone else to perform that work for the phone owner. Someone that
owns a smartphone may jailbreak it, but the exemption does not authorize others to offer their
services or software to jailbreak phones. But it may be the case that courts would interpret the
anti-trafficking provisions not to prohibit the offering of jailbreaking services or software, given
the trend among some courts to hold that only circumvention that supports copyright
infringement is prohibited (and therefore the offering of anti-circumvention services that do not
lead to copyright infringement is not prohibited). 36 Notably, however, MDY Industries v.
Blizzard Entertainment explicitly rejected that trend, holding that the provisions create a new
anti-circumvention right, distinct from copyright infringement. 37 MDY creates a distinct split
among the circuits on how broadly the anti-circumvention provisions apply.

36

See Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Storage Tech.
Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng'g Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005). See also MGE UPS Sys. v. GE
Consumer & Indus. Inc., 96 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1123 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that there is anti-circumvention
liability only where there is a showing that party engaged in circumvention, as opposed to used work after
circumvention).
37
MDY Industries v. Blizzard Entertainment, quoting “Jay Dratler, Cyberlaw: Intellectual Prop. In the
Digital Millennium, § 1.02 (2009) (stating that the DMCA’s “protection is also quite different from the traditional
exclusive rights of the copyright holder . . . [where the] exclusive rights never implicated access to the work, as
such”).”
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Trade secret

1.

Contour Design, Inc. v. Chance Mold Steel Co., 2010 WL 174315 (Dist .N.H 2010).

Contour Design showed that trade secret protection may attach to information before it
has yielded any income. Trade secrets are usually information used in making or selling:
manufacturing processes, customer lists, chip designs, software. The value is shown by an
existing market for the goods or services. Contour Design shows that protection may attach,
however, early in the product cycle. A concept not yet made into a product (an ergonomic roller
as alternative to computer mouse) had sufficient commercial value to be a trade secret. Contour
Design gives some protection to start-ups and other entrepreneurial thinkers, providing legal
protection for valuable ideas.

2.

Bimbo Bakeries USA Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2010).

Bimbo Bakeries represents an important expansion in the scope of trade secret
protection. In recent years, some courts had adopted the doctrine of “inevitable disclosure,”
enjoining a competitor from hiring a key employee where trade secrets would inevitably be used
in the new position. Bimbo Bakeries lowered the bar, holding an injunction appropriate where .
36
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there is “sufficient likelihood, or substantial threat” that trade secrets will be disclosed or used.
The rule requires no showing of misappropriation or intent to use trade secrets. In Bimbo
Bakeries, the employee had repeatedly accessed confidential information shortly before leaving
to join the competitor, showing his intent to use the information in his new position. His new
position was substantially similar to his old one, meaning that the information (such as market
information) would be valuable in that position. There was no showing that he had actually used
the information for the competitor – and in fact at that time signed a statement that the
competitor did not intend him to use any confidential information from his former employer. But
given his recent efforts to access the information and likelihood he would use it in his new
position, the court held a temporary injunction appropriate. Bimbo Bakeries shows that
employees remain the most important data storage devices.

3.

United States v. Aleynikov, No. 10 Cr. 96 (DLC), ( S.D.N.Y., 2010).

Aleynikov held that a bank’s high-frequency trading software qualified as a trade secret,
meaning that taking the software to a new employer violated the Economic Espionage Act. It
was not necessary that the bank be marketing the software to others for it to be protected.
Aleynikov reminds that intellectual property also may have strong protection under criminal laws.

4.

Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Mortensen, 606 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2010)

Nationwide Mutual reflects the many ways in which intellectual property law adapts to
new technologies – often by not extending protection. A trade secret must be information not
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readily available to others. Compiling a valuable data base does not a trade secret make, where
the same information is publicly available, albeit on paper. The data base in Nationwide Mutual
Insurance was valuable to the business, especially because is was in electronic form. An
electronic base is quicker to search, easier to organize, and can serve the business in many ways.
The value to the business did not derive from the customer information being secret. To the
contrary, the same information was available from public sources. Simply adapting old methods
to new technologies does not vest them with legal protection. 38

5.

JustMed Inc. v. Byce, 600 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2010).

JustMed provided several examples of behavior concerning a trade secret that the court
deemed inappropriate, but not misappropriation. A disgruntled employee deleted copies of the
source code of the company’s crown jewel software; deposited portions of the software as part of
an attempt to register the software’s copyright; and threatened to withhold the software from the
company. Misappropriation, however, requires wrongful acquisition, use, or disclosure of the
trade secret. Deleting it, withholding it, and submitting partial copies in confidence to the
Copyright Office fall outside those categories.
JustMed also had an important holding on a related copyright issue. Just whose code was
it anyway? The software developer, after all, was accused of trade secret misappropriation for
taking code that he himself had written. If he was the author of the code, he would hold the
copyright in the code. Under the work-made-for-hire doctrine, however, if he wrote the code as
38

Similar issues arise in patent law. See Western Union Co. v. MoneyGram Payment Systems Inc., No.
2010-1080 (Fed. Cir., 2010)(holding that a claimed invention was obvious, and so not patentable, where it consisted
simply of replacing telephone and fax methods with an internet method)
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an employee, the employer would be deemed to be the author. So the key question was, whether
he was working as an employee or an independent contractor.
Several factors weighed toward independent contractor status. He worked at home, not at
the office. He set his own hours and had great freedom in setting his working conditions. He did
not receive a salary, rather was paid instock.The company did not list him as an employee for tax
purposes or employee benefits. Under older case law, those factors would have been decisive. In
pa;reticular, courts are very leery where a company fails to treat a person as an employee for tax
and other filing purposes, then claims the person as an employee, to claim ownership of the
copyright. But JustMed took a more practical approach, emphasizing that the dispute arose in a
small, start-up company. Just ventures often pay insufficient attention to formalities. The
software developer worked under the supervision and direction of the company; took on
additional tasks, that were assigned as to an employee, as opposed to the specific projects that an
independent contractor took on; and appeared to regard himself as en employee in his dealings
with the company.

6.

R.C. Olmstead, Inc. v. CU Interface, LLC, 606 F.3d 262 (6th Cir. 2010)

In JustMed , the court gave leeway for the informal practices of a start-up company. But
informality may not be forgiven where it undercuts the relevant policy for protection. Trade
secret law helps those who help themselves. Valuable information, unknown to competitors who
could derive value from it, may not be a trade secret. To have the legal protection of trade secret
law, a party itself must take reasonable measures to keep the information secret. In R.C.
Olmstead, the court held that a user interface not a trade secret, because the claimaint showed it
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to others without requiring a confidentiality agreement or imposing restrictions against third
party access. To have trade secret protection, one cannot rely simply on the discretion of others.
Legal and practical restrictions must be used, to trigger the additional protection of trade secret
law.

7.

MGE UPS Sys. v. GE Consumer & Indus. Inc., 96 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1123 (5th Cir.

2010)

As in patent and copyright, trade secret can present vexing questions about remedies.
Showing that a competitor had access to trade secrets and sold a competing product is not
enough to recover damages. Rather, the plaintiff must prove that sales were attributable to the
use of the purloined information. Here, the competitor was able to use software because it had
access to an external hardware security key (called a "dongle"). The competitor subsequently
used the software in a product. Even if there was misappropriation, the trade secret holder failed
to show that any particular profits were attributable to the misappropriation. Ideas may be a key
asset in the information age, but to recover for misappropriation of that information will require
hard market evidence.

8.

Silvaco Data Systems v. Intel Corp., 184 Cal. App. 4th 210; 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 27 (2010)

Intel was not liable for trade secret misappropriation for using code that was created
using trade secrets, where code supplied to Intel did not contain the trade secret information.
This case emphasizes the limited nature of trade secret protection. A party that misappropriates
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information may be liable, but subsequent good faith parties that use the information are not. If a
trade secret is wrongfully published, for example, it nevertheless becomes information free for
anyone to use.

9.

Mattel Inc. v. MGA Entertainment Inc., 616 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2010).

An idea is not protected by copyright or patent. Rather, a party must rely on trade secret
law and contracts for legal protection. As with other forms of intellectual property, care must be
taken when drafting contracts. Mattel held that an assignment of “inventions” in an employment
contract may not include an assignment of ideas. The employer would thus not have the rights to
control product ideas of an employee, once the employee had moved to another company. The
stakes may be considerable. In Mattel, the question involved the idea of Bratz dolls, a product
which produced many millions in revenue.

10.

Faiveley Transport Malmo Ab, v WABTEC Corporation, 559 F.3d 110 (2nd Cir. 2009)

Faiveley is a 2009 case, with a lesson worth stretching the calendar a little. If Inventor
has a patent on brakes for subway trains, no one can make or use such brakes without a license.
But if inventor has no patent and relies on trade secret protection, someone else may use reverse
engineering. The competitor may not get the information by bribing employees or other
industrial espionage, but may examine the product and figure out how it was made. That is what
the competitor attempted in Faiveley. But attempts to reverse engineer the brake design were
unsuccessful. The competitor then enlisted help from an employee of the brake maker, one who
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had frequent access to drawings of the brakes. Not surprisingly, the competitor managed to copy
the brakes. Faiveley held that this was not permitted reverse engineering, this was prohibited
misappropriation of a trade secret.
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